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321 
CARDOZO, THE CANON AND SOME CRITICAL                 
THOUGHTS ABOUT PEDAGOGY 
Deborah W. Post*  
A few years ago, in an effort to link the right and left sides of 
the brains of my students, I had them make movies.  They were told 
that they could dramatize any of the cases we had read that semester.  
A few of the movies were notable for their production values: before 
there was a LEGO Batman movie,1 my students used Legos to make a 
movie about a contractual dispute over the existence of a ghost in a 
house.2   Two students, one of whom had been an actor, dramatized the 
Baby M case.3  But the film that was the most fun, I think, was the 
dramatization of Jacob and Youngs v. Kent.4  
If you view the beginning of this film,5 you will note that the 
student who plays Cardozo, Andrew Koster, begins with a tongue in 
cheek parody of Cardozo’s thought process while writing this opinion. 
In his role as Cardozo, he engages in self-criticism, noting that he 
“stayed up all night reading the dictionary” and that he was planning 
on writing a “verbose opinion” with “words no one can understand” 
that will be “even more confusing than Palsgraf.”6 
 
*Professor Emerita, Jacob F. Fuchsberg Law Center, Touro College.  I would like to thank 
Professor Samuel Levine, Director of the Jewish Law Institute, who has organized several 
conferences over the years, for his invitations to attend and to participate in these conferences. 
I have enjoyed and benefited from the opportunities I have had to meet so many eminent 
scholars and hear their presentations.  
1 THE LEGO BATMAN MOVIE (Warner Bros. Pictures 2017). 
2 Stambovsky v. Ackley,  572 N.Y.S.2d 672 (App. Div. 1991). 
3 In re Baby M, 542 A.2d 52 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1988). 
4 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921).  
5 Ara Ayvazian, Ashley Haelen, Peggy Zabakolas, Larry Przetakiewicz, et al., Student film: 
Jacobs and Young Inc. v. George Kent (2010), http://works.bepress.com/deborah_post/4/.  
6 See id. Mr. Koster was referring to a decision written by Cardozo in a tort case.  That case, 
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad, 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928), is also part of the canon and is 
discussed in other articles in this issue.  
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For years I have persisted in teaching Jacob and Youngs, Inc. 
v. George Edward Kent, Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon,7 and 
Varney v. Ditmars,8 which features a dissent by Cardozo, in my 
Contracts classes, and Meinhard v. Salmon9 in the Business 
Organizations class.  There has always been resistance by students.  
The students have always complained about Cardozo’s literary style. 
And while Cardozo is firmly ensconced in the canon, probably now 
and forever more, there is at least one faculty member at another law 
school who has developed a strategy for dealing with students who find 
Cardozo’s prose impenetrable.  He posted a message on the Contracts 
listserv reporting that he simply “translates” Jacob and Youngs v. Kent 
into “plain English.”  
I did not reply online, but my immediate reaction was, “Why 
would you want to do that?”  How close could he possibly have                      
come to communicating the ideas that Cardozo expressed? More 
importantly, why shouldn’t students have to read difficult texts, even 
texts that on the first, second, or even third reading may seem 
incomprehensible to them? In response to Mr. Koster, as a 
representative of dozens of students I have taught over the years, and 
any contracts professors who feel it is necessary to translate Cardozo 
for students, I would simply say that these are not “words that no one 
understands.”  And yes, one might need a dictionary to look up 
unfamiliar words, but what is wrong with expanding one’s 
vocabulary?10  Of course, I recognize that these complaints are not 
 
7 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).  
8 111 N.E. 822 (N.Y. 1916). 
9 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928). 
10 One of my first jobs after graduating from college was a secretarial position.  I worked 
for Robert Rahtz, Executive Editor of the school book division at Macmillan Publishing 
Company.  While I was there I witnessed what I would characterize as the “dumbing down” 
of grade school and high school textbooks. Competition among publishers for adoptions by 
various states was intense. As part of an effort to compete, publishers asked authors to respond 
to declining reading levels. The effort to make textbooks easier to read (smaller words 
required—no three syllable words allowed), as some scholars at the time noted, had 
unfortunate consequences. As experts noted:  
Textbooks had become too easy for the optimal development of reading, 
particularly for students reading at grade level and above.  The analysis of 
textbooks published during the 1970s showed that many for the eleventh 
and twelfth grades were written at ninth or tenth-grade reading level, while 
the reading passages on the SATs were written on the eleventh or twelfth-
grade level. . . . Although easier books may lead to better comprehension, 
they also, if too easy, lead to slower reading development.   
REBECCA BARR, DAVID PEARSON, MICHAEL L KAMIL, PETER B. MOSENTHAL, HANDBOOK OF 
READING RESEARCH, VOL. 2, 133 (1991).  
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simply about vocabulary.  They are a symptom of a problem that is 
much more serious.   
A very important part of legal education in the first year is, or 
should be, an introduction to the history and traditions of the 
profession.  Cases read in the first year provide a template for legal 
analysis and an introduction to legal doctrines.  They also introduce 
students to the great minds that have shaped the law, decisions that 
have transformed the law, and with a little effort, to the events in the 
lives of people whose disputes become jural dramas, the performance 
of which might be a first world version of “normative communitas.”11  
Judge John Noonan, in his book, Masks of the Law, notes that 
law had been taught in the past using “presentations to students of 
imaginary characters, ‘hypotheticals’ in which imaginary characters 
get into the legal difficulties the teachers wants to explore . . . where 
depersonalized actors illustrate the issues.”12  This method, he notes, 
is “an excellent one for exploring doctrinal alternatives with strict 
impartiality.”13   
Noonan’s criticism extends to the case method when the people 
who are parties to the dispute are completely depersonalized. He 
argues that judicial opinions are not “concrete enough” and the parties 
“lose personal identity.”14 The problem with this approach, he 
suggests, is that decontextualized cases do not “contribute to the moral 
education essential to the professional preparation of lawyers.”15 
Students fail to develop the “sense of responsibility of those who by 
their thought and action make the system exist.”16 
I will simply note that this is not a matter of historical interest, 
a criticism of contemporary jurisprudence or casebooks from which 
we teach, but also a description of a methodology currently used on the 
essay portion of the uniform bar exam and especially on the multiple 
choice questions. Of course, depersonalized and oversimplified 
 
11 VICTOR TURNER, THE RITUAL PROCESS: STRUCTURE AND ANTI-STRUCTURE 131-65 
(1969).  
12 JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., Forward, in PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOZO, HOLMES, 
JEFFERSON, AND WYTHE AS MAKERS OF THE Masks IX (1976). 
13 Id.  
14 NOONAN, supra note 12, at xix. 
15 NOONAN, supra note 12, at xix. 
16 NOONAN, supra note 12, at xix. 
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hypotheticals are often used in law school assessments as well as the 
bar exam.17 
 The accrediting body for law schools, the Council on Legal 
Education and Admission to the Bar, places a great deal of weight on 
bar passage rates for schools.18  The response by faculty at many 
schools has been to adopt teaching techniques that emphasize doctrinal 
competence. Among the most pernicious is the strategy of                         
“flipping the classroom.”19 Notably, “flipping” is all about doctrinal 
competence and features exactly the sort of hypotheticals Noonan 
criticized.20   Flipping the classroom is billed as “experiential learning” 
but apparently the “experience” of reading, dissecting, translating, and 
 
17 Examples of some of the hypotheticals used in the bar examination can be found at the 
website for the Uniform Bar Exam, http://www.ncbex.org/exams/ube.   
18 The fight over bar passage rates is one of many issues precipitating the crisis in legal 
education.  These issues include the cost of legal education, declining applications for 
admission, changing measures for determining who is qualified to attend law school, and bar 
passage rates for schools and placement in law related jobs. Last year the Council on Legal 
Education and Admission to the Bar attempted unsuccessfully to adopt a higher standard for 
the rate at which graduates pass the bar examination.  The Council had been threatened with 
loss of its accrediting authority by a recommendation to the Department of Education by the 
National Advisory Committee on Institutional Quality and Integrity. Kyle McEntee, 
Transcript Reveals Debate over ABA’s Accrediting Power, BLOOMBERG L. (Aug. 3, 2016), 
https://bol.bna.com/transcript-reveals-debate-over-abas-accrediting-power/.  An attempt by 
the Council to increase the number of graduates who must pass the bar if a law school is to 
maintain its accreditation was defeated by the American Bar Association House of Delegates.  
In the end, this is as much a fight about admission standards – who should be admitted to law 
school – as it is about bar passage. Stephanie Francis Ward, ABA House Rejects Bar  Exam 
Proposal ABA JOURNAL (APR. 2017), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/aba_ 
house_rejects_bar_exam_proposal; Memorandum, American Bar Association, Managing 
Director’s Guidance Memo (August 2016), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/governancedocuments/2016_au
gust_guidance_memo_S316.authcheckdam.pdf.   
19 Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Flipped Classroom, NW. L.: WORD ON THE STREETERVILLE 
(Sept. 6, 2013), https://deansblog.law.northwestern.edu/2013/09/06/the-flipped-classroom/ 
(“At the law school, we began experimenting with flipped classrooms last year for a traditional 
Contracts/Sales class.  Prior to class, students watched narrated PowerPoint lectures, worked 
in online discussion groups to solve hypothetical problems, and worked through problems 
from the assigned textbook.  While in class, students worked in teams on professor-assigned 
problems, presented group projects to the class, and interacted with the professor on a class-
wide problem.  The professor gave short, focused lectures on the more challenging topics for 
reinforcement.  The professor who taught the flipped class noted that students came to class 
better prepared and the quality of responses to questions was notably high.  Moreover, the 
quality of the exam answers was higher than in the traditional course counterpart.”).  
20 Catherine A. Lemmer, A View from the Flip Side: Using the “Inverted Classroom” to 
Enhance the Legal Information Literacy of the International LL.M. Student, 105:4 L. LIBR. J. 
461, 464 (2013). 
4
Touro Law Review, Vol. 34 [2018], No. 1, Art. 19
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss1/19
2018 CARDOZO, THE CANON AND PEDAGOGY 325 
organizing case law is not a skill featured in this methodology.21  Nor 
is there much discussion of the broader issues of culture, history and 
social change that can be addressed during a discussion of cases that 
are part of the canon.   
I agree with Judge Noonan. Even if these denuded 
hypotheticals are a more efficient way to prepare students for the bar 
exam, a great deal would be lost if the case method were completely 
abandoned.  The “moral education” to which he refers cannot occur in 
schools where the opinions of Cardozo in cases such as Jacob and 
Youngs v. Kent, Meinhard v. Salmon, and even Lucy, Lady Duff-
Gordon, which references a contract that Cardozo found to be “instinct 
with obligation,”22 are not part of the curriculum.  Without the case 
law method, graduates of law school would be armed with a degree 
and only a superficial understanding of what it means to be a part of a 
community that has a history, tradition and culture that is unique to our 
profession.   
I have my favorite judges. Roger Traynor among them, not 
only because of his decisions in Drennan v. Star Paving23 and Pacific 
Gas and Electric Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage and Rigging 
Company,24 but because in 1948, as chief judge of the Court of Appeals 
in California, he wrote the majority opinion in Perez v. Sharp,25 
declaring California’s anti-miscegenation unconstitutional twenty 
years before the Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in Loving 
v. Virginia.26  But for teaching purposes, I believe none can compare 
to Cardozo. 
There are always new decisions that should be added to the 
canon; cases that prompt us to consider our basic values and our 
commitment to deeply held beliefs.  Judge Frank Easterbrook turned 
the world of contracts upside down when he changed the rule that the 
“offeror is master of the offer” to “the vendor is master of the offer.”27  
The decision was controversial and sparked a lengthy discussion 
 
21 Jackie Gerstein, Flipped Classroom: The Full Picture for Higher Education, USER 
GENERATED EDUCATION (May 15, 2012, 11:14 PM), https://usergeneratededucation.word 
press.com/2012/05/15/flipped-classroom-the-full-picture-for-higher-education/. 
22 Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. at 214 (quoting McCall Co. v. Wright, 133 A.D. 62, 
68 (N.Y. App. Div. 1909)). 
23 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958). 
24 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968). 
25 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948). 
26 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
27 Hill v. Gateway, 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1997). 
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among law school professors.28  It was a decision in which one judge 
changed a fixed legal principle to set the stage for an examination of 
the relationship between buyer and seller in an era of mass 
merchandising and online sales. Although I disagree with the opinion 
in that case (and maybe the hubris of Easterbrook as well),29 his 
decision in the Gateway case absolutely should be part of the canon in 
contracts.  But I believe Cardozo and his decisions in contracts and 
business organizations are singularly important because they combine 
a deep knowledge of the world of commerce with explicit references 
to norms that operate to curb exploitation of a less powerful party. 
Even more important is the opportunity that a Cardozo decision 
provides to really explore the deliberative process that judges use to 
decide a case and the strategies that are employed in writing an opinion 
that is persuasive.  The post on the contracts listserv to which I referred 
earlier and the reaction of my own students to Cardozo opinions reflect 
a new reality confronting law schools.  Law schools are professional 
schools and law is a graduate program.  Too much of the intellectual 
content, the philosophy of law, has been stripped from the curriculum.   
Too little attention is paid to the deliberative process in judicial 
decisions.  I have always thought that the first semester of the first year 
would be the best place to offer students a course that focuses on 
jurisprudence.  Instead, law students are focused on pulling the “rule” 
or “doctrine” from a case and with a mechanical process of applying 
the rule or doctrine in other hypothetical cases.  The idea that “drills” 
are helpful in teaching the law has preempted discussions of how and 
why judges reason their way to a particular conclusion and why and 
how a dissenting judge could examine the same facts and reach the 
opposite conclusion.30  
 
28 The Gateway Thread was published as a symposium issue. Symposium, Common Sense 
and Contracts Symposium, 16 TOURO L. REV. 1037 (2000). The actual American Association 
of Law Schools thread can be found at The Gateway Thread – AALS Contracts Listserv, 16 
TOURO L. REV. 1147 (2000).  
29 Gateway laid the foundation for a series of decisions that I believe eliminated proof of 
actual assent and replaced it with the concept of a “rolling contract” and presumed assent by 
the buyer if the seller disclosed the terms in a way that gave the buyer reasonable notice and 
clear instructions on how the offer could be rejected. See, e.g., Nguyen v. Barnes and Noble 
Inc., No. SACV 12-812-JLS (RNBx), 2015 WL 12766050 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2015) and 
DeFontes v. Dell Comput. Corp., No. C.A. PC 03-2636, 2004 WL 253560 (R.I. Super. Jan. 
29, 2004), aff’d, 984 A.2d 1061 (R.I. 2009). 
30 I think one of the most pernicious inventions in legal education has been the introduction 
of formulae, IRAC and CREAC, which suggest that legal reasoning is a mechanical process. 
They are reductive and misleading.  I realize that lists have a long history in literature about 
legal analysis.  Karl Llewelyn’s lectures on the legal process are an early example and his 
6
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Cardozo’s Nature of the Judicial Process,31 a series of speeches 
delivered to law students but no longer read by students, provides some 
insight into the way Cardozo decided cases.  The best judges then and 
now probably proceed in much the same way.  He began with the 
premise that the law is not static; that the principles and doctrines our 
students struggle to master and memorize today might be altered by a 
judge sometime in the future.  The case law method should never be 
simply an exercise in pulling out the rule or doctrine.  Cases should be 
examined in a way that helps students understand the reasoning and 
the various kinds of arguments that judges use to justify their decisions.   
Thinking about Cardozo’s description in The Nature of the 
Judicial Process of the role of philosophy, history and sociology in 
judging would be instructive.32  Students might benefit from reading 
his discussion of the way judges try to reconcile what seem to be 
conflicting rules, how they might respond when changes in society 
raise the issue of obsolescence with respect to a doctrine or legal rule, 
how a judge might take into consideration the relationship between a 
common law doctrine and the cultural beliefs and values in a 
community, or what a sense of justice requires in a particular case.33  
I was not at all surprised to read that Cardozo majored in the 
humanities when he was a student at Columbia.34  Nor was I surprised 
to find that he understood the juridical importance of the social 
sciences or that his book, The Nature of the Judicial Process, describes 
a methodology that is rooted in philosophy, history and sociology. 
Current law students, however, are impatient or even openly hostile to 
the humanities.35   
 
strategies have been replicated and rejected by others who conceived of a better way to teach 
legal analysis.  See, e.g., Paul Wangerin, Skills Training In “Legal Analysis”: A Systematic 
Approach, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 409, 469-71 (1986) (replicating in simplified fashion 
Llewelyn’s “recipe” for legal analysis). See also Alan D. Hornstein, The Myth of Legal 
Reasoning, 40 MD. L. REV. 338, 347 n.9 (1981). 
31 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921). 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 16. 
34 See generally Biography.com Editors, Benjamin Cardozo, BIOGRAPHY.COM, (Aug. 6, 
2017), https://www.biography.com/people/benjamin-cardozo-40728. 
35 See, e.g., Ariela J. Gross, Teaching Humanities Softly: Bringing a Critical Approach to 
the First Year Contracts Class Through Trial and Error, 3 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 19, 20 (2012).  
In this article, Professor Gross discusses her attempt to use the casebook, CONTRACTING LAW, 
I wrote with Amy Kastely and Sharon Hom, which she describes as a “critical race feminist 
casebook” that “engages” the humanities with literature and history and social science. The 
article notes that her students “hated it” and every class that “appeared to depart from black 
letter law.” Id.   
7
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That should not be surprising given the changes that have 
occurred at colleges and universities across the country.  Reports vary, 
but all seem to agree that the number of degrees conferred in the 
humanities has been declining for some time.36  Somewhere between 
7% and 15 % of college graduates major in the humanities.37 
Defenses of the humanities and social sciences, of a liberal 
education generally, have been offered over the years. Articles 
debating the importance of the humanities have appeared in the 
Chronicle of Higher Education38 and Inside Higher Ed.39 The 
American Academy of Arts and Sciences defends the humanities and 
social sciences as essential to a “vibrant, competitive and secure 
nation.”40  Anthony Kronman, former Dean of Yale Law School, 
argues that an understanding of the meaning of life can be found in the 
“careful but critical reading of the great works of literary and 
philosophical imagination.”41 Nicholas Kristof suggests that “the 
humanities are not only relevant but also give us a toolbox to think 
seriously about ourselves and the world,”42 and Fareed Zacharia has 
written a book In Defense of a Liberal Education.43  But it may be too 
late.  The tide turned a long time ago.  Few students today receive the 
kind of education Cardozo had at home or at Columbia.  I would 
 
36 Scott Jaschik, The Shrinking Humanities Major, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Mar. 14, 2016), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/03/14/study-shows-87-decline-humanities-bach 
elors-degrees-2-years. 
37 Id.  
38 John McCumber, How Humanities Can Help Fix the World, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER 
EDUCATION (Oct. 2, 2016), http://www.chronicle.com/article/How-Humanities-Can-Help-
Fix/237955. 
39 W. Robert Connor, The Shrinking Humanities, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 4, 2013), 
https://www.insidehighered.com /views/2013/01/04/essay-importance-understanding-history 
-humanities. 
40 COMMISSION ON THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES, AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ARTS 
& SCIENCES, THE HEART OF THE MATTER: THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES FOR A 
VIBRANT, COMPETITIVE, AND SECURE NATION (2013), http://www.humanitiescommission.org/ 
_pdf/hss_report.pdf. 
41 He also noted that he has seen “how studying English, history, art and languages gives 
our students entree into cultures and callings. By connecting diverse ideas and themes across 
academic disciplines, humanities students learn to better reason and analyze, and to 
communicate their knowledge, creativity and ideas.” ANTHONY KRONMAN, EDUCATION’S END: 
WHY OUR COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES HAVE GIVEN UP ON THE MEANING OF LIFE (Yale Univ. 
Press 2007).  
42 Nicholas Kristof, Don’t Dismiss the Humanities, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/14/opinion/nicholas-kristof-dont-dismiss-the-humanities. 
Html?mcubz=1. 
43 FAREED ZACHARIA, IN DEFENSE OF A LIBERAL EDUCATION (2015). 
8
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speculate that most of them did not have the kind of education I 
received at Hofstra University in the 1970s.  
While I cannot say definitively that the problems we see in law 
schools today are linked to the decline in the number of students who 
major in the humanities, I can say that students are struggling in a way 
they have not in the past.  Many seem to lack the skills that are thought 
to be associated with a study of philosophy, history, literature, or the 
social sciences – critical thinking, an understanding of the human 
condition, and an ability to engage in moral reasoning.  These skills, if 
not essential to the practice of the law, at least provide an advantage to 
those lawyers and law school graduates who have them. 
The case which is the subject of this essay, Jacob and Youngs 
v. Kent, no matter how florid some of the language might seem, 
illustrates both critical thinking and moral reasoning.44  It is our job as 
faculty to lead them through the case; to take the case apart and 
consider its structure and the arguments that build to the conclusion 
Cardozo reaches. It may be helpful to provide students with 
background – a brief foray into jurisprudence.  Consider the way 
Cardozo treats the case in The Nature of the Judicial Process.45  He 
includes it in the first lecture, The Method of Philosophy, as an example 
of the way judges attempt to “square their justice with their logic.” 46   
Cardozo’s definition of philosophy focuses on logical 
reasoning, contrasting inductive and deductive reasoning, emphasizing 
the synergy or interaction between the two.47  There should be fidelity 
to legal principles but an acknowledgement that there are often 
competing principles.  These can be used as “a weapon . . . hewing a 
path to justice.”48  Cardozo rejects outright the idea that doctrines or 
legal rules are absolute and inviolable.  These are “evils and dangers” 
that have “touched the common law only here and there, and lightly.”49   
Cardozo embraces the idea of change or evolution of the legal rules or 
doctrine “adapting themselves to the ever varied and changing 
exigencies of life.”50  Of course the law does not adapt itself.  Judges 
are in the business of “adapting” the common law.  This discussion 
 
44 Jacob & Youngs, Inc., 129 N.E. at 889. 
45 CARDOZO, supra note 31.  
46 CARDOZO, supra note 31, at 44. 
47 CARDOZO, supra note 31, at 22-23, 46.  
48 CARDOZO, supra note 31, at 45. 
49 CARDOZO, supra note 31, at 46. 
50 CARDOZO, supra note 31, at 46-47 (quoting FRANÇOIS GÉNY, Revue du droit public, at 
127 (1895)).  
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makes some students uncomfortable.  Students want certainty. They 
are uncomfortable with the suggestion that rules are not absolute.  They 
want to know that there is a “right answer” which is why a discussion 
of Cardozo’s judicial philosophy is an important entree into this case.  
The case provides an opportunity to return to the issue of 
justice.  By the time most casebooks reach the topic of substantial 
performance, a consideration of “justice” as an element of proof has 
been discussed in connection with the doctrines of promissory estoppel 
and promise for a past benefit. Students are familiar with the question 
“what does justice require?”  A discussion of justice, if not explicit, is 
certainly implicit in Cardozo’s opinion.51  There is no reference to 
reliance or unjust enrichment, but there is a discussion of forfeiture – 
the contractor’s loss of an expected payment and, if the breach is 
immaterial, the retention by the owner of money that should have been 
paid.52  
What students might not see is the significance of structural 
inequality in this case and in the way Cardozo lays out the facts of the 
case.  He does this without an explicit reference to an attempted abuse 
of power.  I believe he did the same in Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 
although feminists take issue with the manner in which he trivializes 
her success and paints a picture of her as a “nasty woman.”53  
“Structural” inequality is not about the relative power of two people, 
but the relative power of individuals who are in a particular 
relationship with one another.  
The statement of the facts at the very beginning of the case 
communicates this disparity in power and suggests that the defendant, 
to use a term that has some currency at this moment in time, is 
“stiffing” the plaintiff.54  A wealthy man enters into a contract for the 
construction of a mansion in Jericho, Long Island, and after living in 
this house for a year, he discovers, after a demand for final payment 
has been made by the contractor, that non-conforming pipe has been 
 
51 Amy B. Cohen, Reviving Jacob and Youngs, Inc. v. Kent: Material Breach Doctrine 
Reconsidered, 42 VILL. L. REV. 65, 77 (1997) (discussing how Benjamin N. Cardozo’s opinion 
promoted justice). 
52 Jacob & Youngs, Inc., 129 N.E. at 890. 
53 Mary Jo Frug, Re-reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 
AM. U. L. REV, 1065 (1985).  A discussion of Cardozo’s skills as a writer and the 
characterization of Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon as a “nasty woman” first appeared in Karl N. 
Llewellyn, A Lecture on Appellate Advocacy, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 627, 637 (1962).  
54 Jacob & Youngs, Inc., 129 N.E. at 890. 
10
Touro Law Review, Vol. 34 [2018], No. 1, Art. 19
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss1/19
2018 CARDOZO, THE CANON AND PEDAGOGY 331 
used in the construction of the house.55  But, as Cardozo has noted, this 
was not a “one off” incident of exploitation.56  In The Nature of the 
Judicial Process Cardozo explained that the doctrine of substantial 
performance was “often applied” for the “protection of builders who 
in trifling details and without evil purpose have departed from their 
contracts.”57    
“Stiffing” is not a legal term but it is one that has resonance in 
the current political climate.  It popped up on the contracts listserv in 
a discussion of Donald Trump’s failure to pay the contractors who 
worked on his casinos and hotels or to repay the banks that lent him 
the money to build them.58  I am happy to report that the contracts 
professors on the contracts listserv did not think “stiffing” could be 
justified or rationalized as an efficient breach.  I think it is safe to say 
that a person reading Cardozo’s statement of the facts in Jacob and 
Youngs v. Kent would probably come away with a sense that there is 
something unseemly in Kent’s behavior, some attempt to manufacture 
a reason to not pay the contractor.59   
Both the majority opinion, written by Cardozo, and the dissent, 
written by Justice Chester B. McLaughlin, discuss the factual support 
for the application of the doctrine of substantial performance in this 
case.60  The disagreement has to do with the methodology applied to 




57 CARDOZO, supra note 29, at 44 (1921). 
58 Alexandra Berzon, Election 2016 Trumps Business Plan Left Unpaid Bills, WSJ A5, June 
10, 2016 (“Donald Trump often boasts on the presidential campaign trail that hardball tactics 
helped make him a successful businessman.  His methods have also left behind bitter tales 
among business owners who say he shortchanged them”). Shawn Tully, Donald Trump Got a 
Tax Break for Stiffing Contractors, FORTUNE (Oct. 8, 2016),  http://fortune.com/2016/ 
10/08/donald-trump-taxes-contractors/ (“Much has already been written about the fact that 
Trump’s multiple bankruptcies stiffed a long-list of small businesses, from carpet suppliers to 
chandelier distributors to cabinet-makers for slot machines. What hasn’t been reported before 
is that those unpaid bills were also used to swell Trump’s future tax deductions. In other words, 
Trump not only stiffed many contractors, he also created a tax benefit off the backs of the 
tradesmen who built his casinos and skyscrapers.”). See also Jonathan O’Connell, Two 
Contractors Allege Getting Stiffed for Work on Trump’s D.C. Hotel, WASHINGTON POST,                       
(JAN. 5, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/digger/wp/2017/01/05/two-contractor 
s-allege-getting-stiffed-for-work-on-trumps-d-c-hotel/.  
59 Jacob & Youngs, Inc., 129 N.E. at 890. 
60 Justice McLaughlin argued that the contract contained an express condition and, 
therefore, the doctrine of substantial performance would not apply.  He then proceeded to 
challenge Cardozo with respect to substantial performance on the facts.  Id. at 892-93 
(McLaughlin J., dissenting). 
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qualitative analysis and the dissent opts for a quantitative measure.61  
Were the pipes used the same quality as the Reading pipes included in 
the specifications by the architect or is the test the amount of pipe that 
is not of Reading manufacture?  
I think cases that have a majority and dissenting opinion are 
important.  This is where an ideological divide becomes visible and 
where the way in which facts are interpreted and characterized 
becomes apparent.  This is where students have a chance to examine 
competing world views and examine their own values and beliefs.  
This is a decision in which students can be asked to examine what they 
believe to be “a standard of right conduct” or “customary morality.”62  
There are many who are uncomfortable with discussions of 
morality with respect to contract, particularly with any discussion of 
morality that might be conceived as a standard of behavior that is 
assumed to be universal or rooted in religion and one which is 
narrower, limited to the business community or a particular trade.63   
When I teach Jacob and Youngs v. Kent, I am always amazed 
when students cannot find the four-part test that Cardozo lays out in 
the decision.64  They do not see the guidance he provides on how the 
test can be applied – laying out useful distinctions between complex 
and simple contracts, contracts that are utilitarian and those that have 
an aesthetic component.65  They are waylaid by the discussion of 
conditions (constructive conditions versus express conditions, 
dependent versus independent promises, and covenants or conditions).  
 
61 Id. at 891.  
62 CARDOZO, supra note 31. At this point in the semester students have already seen several 
references in cases to Corbin’s treatise on contracts. Our casebook includes a long quotation 
from Corbin’s treatise with a statement that “a just and reasonable man will not insist upon 
profiting by the other’s mistake.” Corbin’s assumptions about the “mores” (a term with which 
most students are unfamiliar) that govern human behavior, the behavior of “just and 
reasonable,” or Cardozo’s belief in a shared culture with respect to right and wrong behavior, 
can and should be explored with students.  
63 See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, CARDOZO, A STUDY IN REPUTATION, 20-33 (1990). It seems 
to me that Posner bridles at the use of terms like “mores of the community” dismissing what 
Cardozo calls the method of sociology as unfortunate because sociology is a “failed social 
science.”  Ultimately, though, he concedes “In default of clear-cut positive law, people will 
act in accordance with the standards of their commercial and other communities. Insofar as 
the law incorporates those standards it will not defeat people’s reasonable expectations, as it 
might do if it imposed technical, counterintuitive, little known norms upon the lay 
communities.” Id. at 31.  
64 Jacob & Youngs, Inc., 129 N.E. at 890. 
65 Id.  
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But what they miss completely is the connection that is drawn between 
what is morally right and the legal rule that is being applied.  
Cardozo’s opinion links injustice, oppression and forfeiture.                  
I like to point out to students the explicitly moral, even religious, 
language in this case. Cardozo distinguishes between a willful 
transgression and innocent or venial faults.  He references atonement 
and mercy in connection with breaches that are innocent and 
unintentional.  More important, I believe, is the link that is created 
between intent, reason and morality.  There is in Cardozo’s opinion a 
reference to “presumptive intent” – the intent of a party to a contract 
to be reasonable.  If this intent is imputed to a party, in this case, the 
homeowner, Kent, it operates in a way that both  acknowledges human 
imperfection and cures it.66  According to Cardozo, a party does not 
intend, in the absence of “sure and certain” words, to demand 
perfection.67  And so Kent certainly could not have intended to make 
the use of Reading pipe an express condition of the contract.    
Who are the “right-minded men and women” whose 
“customary morality” Cardozo seeks as an objective standard in 
deciding cases?68 This standard then is not “idiosyncratic” but he 
hedges a little when he says that “a duty to conform to the standards of 
the community, the mores of the times” does not preclude or prevent a 
judge from “raising the level of prevailing conduct.”69 This is a 
significant point of engagement with students.   
What community are we referencing?  In this moment in time 
when the social fabric seems to have been shredded and “community” 
has become fragmented, is it possible to find shared values or to decide 
what behavior should be repudiated?  The question Cardozo poses is 
one of contractual “intent.”  The “reasonable person” ubiquitous in 
legal analysis is joined by Cardozo to the issue of intent.  In our 
contractual relationships do we expect “perfection” or do we intend 
only to ask for and receive from one another a good faith effort that 
approximates perfection?  Human beings are, by their very nature, 
imperfect.  Perfection might be unattainable.   
Students disagree.  Like Judge McLaughlin, they feel they are 
entitled to ask for perfection.  Their examples, influenced no doubt by 
the case before them, usually involve Anderson or Pella Windows.  If, 
 
66 Id. at 891.  
67 Id.  
68 CARDOZO, supra note 29.   
69 CARDOZO, supra note 29.   
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however, you interrogate them with respect to the standards that should 
be applied to them in their performance as students in law school, it is 
a different matter.  Should a student get an F if he or she misses a 
deadline for submitting a paper; is an F an appropriate grade if facts 
are misstated or, as I have seen more and more often of late, when the 
student makes up facts that allow her to make an argument that 
otherwise would not apply.  
I believe that the core concept or idea that is expressed in 
Cardozo’s opinion – linking fairness, justice and reasonableness with 
“presumable intention” -- with our better selves -- is the reason why 
this decision has such staying power.  Intent and reason are linked and 
reason incorporates concepts of fairness and justice. But this 
exploration of Cardozo’s jurisprudence is not simply a matter of 
finding the test for “substantial performance” and applying it to other 
hypotheticals. Cardozo’s opinion can and should prompt a more 
extended discussion of the role of law, the existence of shared values, 
and the process by which lawyers and judges regulate commercial 
relationships.   
 
14
Touro Law Review, Vol. 34 [2018], No. 1, Art. 19
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss1/19
